Montana Law Review
Volume 81
Issue 1 Winter 2020

Article 5

5-1-2020

City of Missoula v. Kroschel: Missing the Mark on Montana's Terry
Statute
Kirsi Luther
kirsimarcus@gmail.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Kirsi Luther, City of Missoula v. Kroschel: Missing the Mark on Montana's Terry Statute, 81 Mont. L. Rev.
113 (2020).

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks at University of Montana. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Montana Law Review by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks at University of Montana.
For more information, please contact scholarworks@mso.umt.edu.

Luther: <em>Montana's</em> Terry <em>Statute</em>
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\81-1\MON105.txt

unknown

Seq: 1

31-MAR-20

9:40

CITY OF MISSOULA v. KROSCHEL: MISSING THE MARK
ON MONTANA’S TERRY STATUTE
Kirsi Luther*

I. INTRODUCTION
In City of Missoula v. Kroschel,1 the Montana Supreme Court had the
opportunity to define the parameters of a lawful stop under Montana’s
Terry statute.2 After twenty-year-old Marcy Kroschel was questioned and
detained by campus police for more than an hour upon suspicion that she
was a minor in possession of alcohol, Kroschel raised a statutory and constitutional challenge to the officers’ conduct.3 The Court unanimously
concluded that she was subject to a custodial interrogation and never given
a Miranda warning.4 However, the interesting statutory question went relatively unaddressed.
This note argues that the Court wrongly decided the issue of whether
Officer Parsons’ initial conduct violated the governing statute. By resolving
the case on the Miranda issue, the Court failed to provide meaningful interpretive guidance5 to a statute that provides Montanans with an important
right: the right of a nondriver, briefly detained during an investigatory stop,
to decline to answer an officer’s questioning free of consequence. Because
this note focuses primarily on the statutory question, my analysis will leave
the constitutional issues largely unaddressed. Nevertheless, because the
Court’s resolution of the statute raises constitutional implications, Part II
will begin with a brief discussion of the legal backdrop surrounding noncustodial police encounters. It will then discuss stop-and-identify statutes and
the Montana legislature’s decision to enact its Terry statute. Part III will
discuss the Court’s opinion in City of Missoula v. Kroschel. Part IV will
infer a reading of the statute from the Court’s opinion, pose a critique of
* Law clerk, United States District Court. This note began as a project for Professor Anthony
Johnstone’s Legislation course. I would like to thank Professor Johnstone and the staff and editors of the
Montana Law Review for their assistance.
1. 419 P.3d 1208 (Mont. 2018).
2. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46–5–401 (2015).
3. Kroschel, 419 P.3d at 1213–14.
4. Id. at 1225; Kroschel, 419 P.3d at 1226 (Gustafson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
5. Appellant’s Op. Br., City of Missoula v. Kroschel, 2017 WL 2692832, at 12 n.2 (Mont. 2017)
(No. DA 17-0184). In asking the Court for clarity on the statute, counsel for appellant explained that
“ASUM Legal Services has many cases every year with seminal non-vehicular investigatory stop issues.
However, the requirements of [the Terry statute] and Driscoll are often brushed off by lower courts, as
in this case, because this area of the law is relatively undeveloped.”
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that reading, and then propose an alternate analysis of Montana’s Terry statute.
II. BACKDROP
A. The Federal Standard
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides
“the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.”6
A search or seizure effectuated without a warrant is per se unreasonable,
subject to a few “specifically established and well delineated exceptions.”7
One longstanding warrant exception permits an officer to arrest an individual when the officer has probable cause to believe that person has committed a crime.8 Terry v. Ohio9 addressed the constitutionality of warrantless
noncustodial police encounters and held that the Fourth Amendment permits an officer to briefly detain a person when the officer has a reasonable
suspicion that “criminal activity is afoot.”10
Once validly stopped, an officer has wide latitude to question a suspect. For example, the Fourth Amendment is not violated where an officer
asks questions that are unrelated to those reasons justifying the stop.11
While the Supreme Court has never squarely held that an officer may demand a person’s driver’s license and various papers in the context of a
traffic stop, it appears to permit this practice12 and circuit courts have found
it constitutional.13
While the Fourth Amendment allows officers to freely ask questions
during a routine stop, in Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District of Nevada14 the
Court addressed whether a state can criminalize a person’s failure to answer. After witnessing a domestic dispute, a concerned citizen called the
Humboldt County Sheriff’s Department to report the incident.15 An officer
dispatched to the scene observed a man standing outside of a truck that
6. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
7. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 372 (1993).
8. Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152 (2004).
9. 392 U.S. 1, 22–23, 27 (1968).
10. Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 330 (2009).
11. Id. at 333.
12. Id. at 327 (quoting Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 255 (2007) (holding that traffic stops
are seizures)); see also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659 (1979) (noting that during routine traffic
stops “licenses and registration papers are subject to inspection”).
13. United States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 437 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d
1215, 1221 (10th Cir. 2001), overruled on non-relevant grounds by United States v. Stewart, 473 F.3d
1265 (10th Cir. 2007).
14. 542 U.S. 177 (2004).
15. Id. at 180.
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matched the description provided by the caller.16 The man, later identified
as Larry Dudley Hiibel, appeared intoxicated.17 The officer approached, explained the reported disturbance, and asked Hiibel to produce identification.18 Hiibel refused.19 Over the course of the encounter, the officer asked
Hiibel to produce identification no less than eleven times, and each time
Hiibel refused.20 Eventually, the officer arrested Hiibel under a Nevada
statute that requires a person to identify his or herself when lawfully
stopped by a peace officer.21 Hiibel was convicted and ultimately appealed
to the United States Supreme Court.22
Hiibel addressed the constitutionality of so-called “stop-and-identify”
statutes. The Court noted that many states, including Montana, have enacted
statutes similar to Nevada.23 Commonly, stop-and-identify statutes “combine elements of traditional vagrancy laws with provisions intended to regulate police behavior” in the course of the stop.24 All stop-and-identify statutes permit an officer to ask for a suspect’s name or require a suspect to
disclose his or her identity.25 The Court noted that numerous states have
adopted the Model Penal Code’s Uniform Arrest Act with language that
allows an officer to “demand [the suspect’s] name, address, business abroad
and whither he is going.”26
Noting the constitutional limitations that constrain stop-and-identify
statutes—for example, such statutes must clearly target specific criminal
conduct27 and not vest the officer with ultimate discretion to decide whether
an individual has complied with the statute’s terms28—the Court upheld
Nevada’s statute because it was “narrow and more precise.”29 As opposed
to the unconstitutional statute in Kolender v. Lawson,30 which required a
suspect to provide a “credible and reliable” means of identification, the
16. Id.
17. Id. at 180–81.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 181.
20. Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 181.
21. Id; Nev. Rev. Stat. (NRS) § 171.123 (2003) (providing that: “Any peace officer may detain any
person whom the officer encounters under circumstances which reasonably indicate that the person has
committed, is committing or is about to commit a crime . . . The officer may detain the person pursuant
to this section only to ascertain his identity and the suspicious circumstances surrounding his presence
abroad. Any person so detained shall identify himself, but may not be compelled to answer any other
inquiry of any peace officer”).
22. Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 182.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 183.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
28. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983).
29. Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 184.
30. 461 U.S. 352 (1983).
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Court noted that Nevada’s statute only required a suspect to disclose his or
her name and did not require the suspect to provide the officer with “a
driver’s license or any other document.”31 It further explained, “[p]rovided
that the suspect either states his name or communicates it to the officer by
other means [i.e., voluntarily providing the officer with a driver’s license]—
a choice, we assume, that the suspect may make—the statute is satisfied
and no violation occurs.”32
The Supreme Court went on to note that the Nevada law was not inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment because “asking questions is an essential part of police investigations” and “a suspect’s identity is a routine
and accepted part of many Terry stops.”33 The Court recognized that the
request for a suspect’s name is directly related “to the purpose, rationale,
and practical demands of a Terry stop.”34 The statute serves a legitimate
government interest because “[t]he threat of criminal sanction helps ensure
that the request for identity does not become a legal nullity.”35 Because the
statute served important governmental interests, such as stopping crime and
identifying dangerous persons, and did not change the nature or purpose of
the stop itself, the Court concluded that the narrow scope of the statute did
not offend the Fourth Amendment.36
The Court then addressed whether the statute violated Hiibel’s right
against self-incrimination and held that the Fifth Amendment was not violated where a person’s refusal to disclose his or her name was not based on
a real or appreciable fear of incrimination.37 However, the Court left open
the question of whether a different outcome was required when “furnishing
identity at the time of a stop would have given the police a link in the chain
of evidence needed to convict the individual of a separate offense.”38
B. The Montana Standard
Montana has codified its search and seizure law, which mirrors the
federal Terry standard and contains a stop-and-identify component:39
(2) A peace officer who has lawfully stopped a person or vehicle under this
section may:
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 184–85.
Id. at 185.
Id. at 185–86.
Id. at 178.
Id. at 188.
Id.
Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 190.
Id. at 191.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46–5–401 (2017).
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(a) Request the person’s name and present address and an explanation of the
person’s actions and, if the person is the driver of a vehicle, demand the
person’s driver’s license and the vehicle’s registration and proof of insurance[.]40

Originally passed in 1972, the statute was significantly amended in 2003
after the Montana Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Krause.41 Krause,
the 2003 legislative history, and the Court’s 2013 decision in State v. Driscoll42 provide helpful context for interpreting the statute’s meaning today.
1. State v. Krause
Krause held that an officer violated a statutory command under thenin-force § 46–5–402(4) when he failed to provide a “mini-Miranda” warning during an otherwise valid stop.43 In Krause, an officer was called to a
private residence after its homeowners observed a stranger parked in their
driveway.44 When the officer arrived, he found Krause asleep behind the
wheel.45 After smelling alcohol on his breath, the officer questioned Krause
about his drinking and Krause admitted to having a few.46 The officer then
asked Krause to step out of the vehicle and perform a field sobriety test,
which he failed.47 The officer never identified himself, nor did he inform
Krause that he was not under arrest during the officer’s initial questioning.48 The officer also never frisked Krause.49
On appeal, Krause argued that the officer failed to comply with Montana’s then-in-force investigatory statute which read:
Stop and frisk. A peace officer who has lawfully stopped a person under
46–5–401 or this section: . . .
(3) may demand the name and present address of the person; and
(4) shall inform the person, as promptly as possible under the circumstances
and in any case before questioning the person, that the officer is a peace
officer, that the stop is not an arrest but rather a temporary detention for an
investigation, and that upon completion of the investigation, the person will
be released if not arrested.50
40. Id. at (2)(a).
41. 44 P.3d 493 (Mont. 2002).
42. 303 P.3d 788 (Mont. 2013).
43. Krause, 44 P.3d at 498.
44. Id. at 494.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 494–95.
47. Id. at 495.
48. Id. at 494–95.
49. Krause, 44 P.3d at 494–95.
50. Id. at 497–98 (citing Mont. Code Ann. § 46–5–402 (2001) repealed by Mont. Code Ann.
46–5–401 (2003)).
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The State argued that the “mini-Miranda warning”51 in subsection (4)
applied only when an individual was frisked, and therefore was not required.52 Additionally, the State argued that the officer stopped Krause pursuant to an “investigatory stop” as opposed to a “stop and frisk” which were
separately codified, and therefore requirements of the latter should not be
imputed to the former.53 Justice Nelson, writing for the majority, rejected
both contentions.54 First, he noted that the prefatory language in
§ 46–5–402 included § 46–5–401 within its scope (“a peace officer who
has lawfully stopped a person under 46–5–401 or this section”).55 Then he
noted that nothing in this statute provided that the “mini-Miranda warning”
be limited to an officer’s frisk.56 Even though Justice Nelson observed that
the legislature had likely not intended this outcome, the Court noted that its
duty was simply to interpret the language before it.57
2. House Bill 40
During the legislative session following Krause, at the behest of the
Justice Department, Butte Representative Brad Newman introduced House
Bill 40 entitled “Clarify Stop-and-Frisk Law.”58 The bill proposed to repeal
§ 46–5–402 and amend § 46–5–401 to provide all requirements governing
stop and frisk into a single statute.59 Additionally, the draft entirely removed the “mini-Miranda” component.60 Representative Newman reasoned
such warnings were a matter of best practices, but argued that these warnings should not be mandated by statute nor should the failure to give a
“mini-Miranda” be grounds for suppression where it is not constitutionally
required.61 The statute proposed by Representative Newman borrowed the
language from § 46–5–402(3), which provided that an officer may “demand
the name and present address of the person,” but added “and an explanation
of the person’s actions.”62
51. See H.R. Judiciary Comm., Comm. Minutes January 20, 58th Leg. Reg. Sess. 11 (Mont. 2003)
(testimony by proponent Leo Gallagher, then County Attorney for Lewis and Clark County (referring to
subsection four as a mini-Miranda)).
52. Krause, 44 P.3d at 497.
53. Id. at 497–98.
54. Id. at 498.
55. Id. (emphasis added).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. History and Final Status of Bills and Resolutions of the Senate and House of Representatives of
the State of Montana, 58th Leg. Reg. Sess. 226 (Mont. 2003).
59. House Bill 40, 58th Leg. Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2003) (As Introduced in House).
60. Id.
61. S. Judiciary Comm., Comm. Minutes March 11, 58th Leg. Reg. Sess. 12 (Mont. 2003).
62. See House Bill 40, 58th Leg. Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2003) (As Introduced in House).
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In committee, Representative Christopher Harris raised concern over
the word “demand,” and asked whether a person could refuse to answer or
whether that would trigger an arrest.63 Colonel Shawn Driscoll of the Montana Highway Patrol, a proponent of the bill, responded that under the current law, a person’s failure to answer an officer’s question could already
give rise to a charge of obstructing justice.64
At the bill’s committee hearing on January 20, 2003, this issue was
raised by Representatives Diane Rice and Jim Shockley. Representative
Rice believed that it was problematic to allow an officer to demand certain
information where a person receives no warning of her Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination.65 Representative Shockley similarly aired
concern that the Fifth Amendment’s protections lose all teeth if a person
may be charged with obstructing justice for failing to answer an officer’s
questions.66 He noted that the language “ ‘may demand’ . . . does not give a
guy a lot of latitude to refuse.”67
Although the bill passed out of committee 13 to 5, concerns remained.68 While the bill was sent to the Senate Judiciary committee largely
as introduced, these same issues were echoed in subsequent hearings.69 On
March 12, the bill was indefinitely tabled.70 Then, only a week later, the bill
was set for a committee meeting where it was amended to reflect that an
officer may “request” but not “demand” “a person’s name, age, and explanation of the person’s actions.”71 With only minor punctuation changes, the
bill left committee, passed the Senate 48 to 0, passed a House vote 99 to 1,
and was ultimately signed into law by the governor on April 15, 2003.72
3. State v. Driscoll
The Montana Supreme Court conducted an analysis of § 46–5–401 for
the first time in State v. Driscoll. In Driscoll, two officers were patrolling
the annual Dillon rodeo and observed Dominic Driscoll in a bar holding a
63. H.R. Judiciary Comm., Comm. Minutes January 20, 58th Leg. Reg. Sess. 12 (Mont. 2003).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See History and Final Status of Bills and Resolutions of the Senate and House of Representatives of the State of Montana, 58th Leg. Reg. Sess. 226 (Mont. 2003).
69. S. Judiciary Comm., Comm. Minutes March 11, 58th Leg. Reg. Sess. 13-17 (Mont. 2003).
70. History and Final Status of Bills and Resolutions of the Senate and House of Representatives of
the State of Montana, 58th Leg. Reg. Sess. 226 (Mont. 2003).
71. S. Judiciary Comm., Comm. Minutes March 12, 58th Leg. Reg. Sess. 2 (Mont. 2003).
72. History and Final Status of Bills and Resolutions of the Senate and House of Representatives of
the State of Montana, 58th Leg. Reg. Sess. 226 (Mont. 2003); Second and Third Reading Votes of Bills
and Resolutions of the Senate and House of Representatives of the State of Montana Volume I, 58th
Leg. Reg. Sess. 53–54 (Mont. 2003).
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can of beer. Because he looked young, the officers approached and asked
how old he was. Driscoll stated that he was twenty-two. The officers asked
to see identification and he refused. The officers then told Driscoll to accompany them outside. There, he was asked to provide his full name and
his date of birth. Driscoll responded with a false name and birthdate. When
dispatch was unable to confirm this information, Driscoll was placed under
arrest. Charged with a minor in possession of alcohol and obstructing justice, Driscoll moved to suppress his statements.73
Turning to the language of the statute, the Court first concluded that
Driscoll was properly stopped and properly asked his age.74 Next, the Court
considered whether the scope of the investigation was improperly expanded
when the officers took Driscoll outside.75 Noting that “the officers approached Driscoll and asked for his age and an ID, rather than for his name,
address, or an explanation for his actions” (which could be read to indicate
that the Court was troubled that the request itself exceeded the scope of the
statute), the Court concluded that it was the officers’ decision to take Driscoll outside absent any additional particularized suspicion that Driscoll was
obstructing justice that resulted in an impermissible expansion of the stop.76
The Court concluded that the officers’ conduct violated the Terry statute.77
III. THE COURT’S DECISION

IN

CITY

OF

MISSOULA V. KROSCHEL

In August of 2015, Marcy Kroschel and her friend Kaitlynn O’Connell
were attending a college football game when Officer Shannon Parsons, a
university police officer, observed Kroschel walking arm-in-arm with
O’Connell and leaning on her for support.78 Suspecting the two of drinking
underage, Officer Parsons approached and smelled alcohol on Kroschel’s
breath.79 The officer asked both women to produce identification.80
O’Connell, who was twenty-one, immediately handed over her driver’s license.81 Kroschel told Officer Parsons she did not have identification on her
because it was in her stadium seat.82 Officer Parsons then asked Kroschel
for her college identification number.83 Kroschel claimed that she was no
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

303 P.3d 788, 789 (Mont. 2013).
Id.
Id. at 790.
Id.
Id. 789–90.
City of Missoula v. Kroschel, 419 P.3d 1208, 1213 (Mont. 2018).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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longer a student and could not recall it.84 Officer Parsons continued to
press, asking Kroschel for her name and her date of birth so that she could
run a check for her driver’s license through the Criminal Justice Information Network database.85 Kroschel then furnished the officer with a false
name and birthdate.86 The false information returned no results.87 Twice
more Officer Parsons asked Kroschel for her correct name and date of
birth.88
When Kroschel’s response did not satisfy Officer Parsons, the officer
told Kroschel that she could be arrested for obstructing justice.89 She also
threatened to take Kroschel into the station so they could determine her
identity there.90 Kroschel began crying, and stated that she did not want to
go to the station.91 She attempted to leave but Officer Parsons physically
stopped her from doing so.92 Kroschel was “crying, scared, and repeatedly
told the officer that she did not want to go with her.”93 Officer Parsons
continued to press and asked Kroschel for her name and birthdate at least
five times during this initial encounter.94 Wanting to get Kroschel in a private place “to protect her privacy and perhaps even her modesty,”95 Officer
Parsons led Kroschel by her arm into the basement of the stadium.96
There, Kroschel and Officer Parsons encountered another campus police officer, Detective Chris Croft.97 Detective Croft “subjected Kroschel to
a second round of questioning” to obtain her real name and date of birth.
Officer Parsons ordered O’Connell away and the two officers escorted
Kroschel into a small room under the stairs. Kroschel, who had up until this
point insisted that she had already provided officers with her correct information, finally wore down and revealed the true spelling of her name and
84. Kroschel, 419 P.3d at 1213.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1213–14.
89. Id. 1214.
90. Kroschel, 419 P.3d at 1214.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Appellant’s Op. Br., City of Missoula v. Kroschel, 2017 WL 2692832, 3 (Mont. 2017).
95. Appellee’s Br., City of Missoula v. Kroschel, 2017 WL 2692832, 24 (Mont. 2017). The State’s
brief provides an odd justification for Officer Parsons’ expansion of the Terry stop. It explains, “Parsons
asked Kroschel to come to a quieter and more private area not to make Kroschel feel uncomfortable, but
to remove her from a loud stadium, protect her privacy and perhaps even her modesty since, the State
supposes, public drunkenness is not widely regarded as socially acceptable behavior.”
96. Kroschel, 419 P.3d at 1214.
97. Id.
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an underage birthdate. Kroschel was then charged with a minor in possession of alcohol and obstructing justice.98
In Municipal Court, Kroschel moved to suppress the evidence under
both Federal and Montana Constitutions and § 46–5–401. Kroschel also argued that her Fifth Amendment rights were violated when she was subjected to a custodial interrogation without a Miranda warning. Kroschel lost
her motion, was convicted, and lost again on appeal to the district court.99
Kroschel then appealed to the Montana Supreme Court.100
The majority opinion, written by Justice Sandefur, first noted that Officer Parsons’ initial stop was valid.101 However, for a stop to continue to
be valid, its “duration and scope . . . must be carefully limited to its ‘underlying justification.’ ”102 Citing Hiibel, the majority observed that “asking
questions is an essential part of police investigations,” and consistent with
that purpose, it is not unconstitutional for states to require compliance with
an officer’s request for information.103 Though subsection (a) of the statute
indicates that an officer may “request a person’s name, current address, and
an explanation” of the person’s conduct, the majority noted that “nothing in
the language or legislative history . . . indicates any legislative intent to
preclude police from asking other questions permissible under the Fourth
Amendment within the limited scope of the stop (i.e., reasonably related in
scope to the particularized suspicion that justified the stop).”104 It then
stated: “If not the functional or substantive equivalent of requesting a person’s name and current address, demanding available proof of identification
is typically likewise reasonably related to the purpose of an investigative
stop for Fourth Amendment purposes.”105 The majority distinguished its
decision from Driscoll by concluding that here, unlike there, Officer Parsons had particularized suspicion that Kroschel was lying before she expanded the scope of the stop by bringing Kroschel downstairs.106 Because
the Court found that Kroschel was eventually arrested and interrogated, the
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Kroschel, 419 P.3d at 1216.
103. Id. at 1216–17.
104. Id. at 1217.
105. Id. The majority cites to Hiibel for the proposition that “demanding available proof of identification” is likewise related to the reasons justifying a stop. Hiibel is clear that an officer may demand
identification (where doing so is reasonably related to the reasons justifying the stop) and the Fourth
Amendment is not violated where an individual choses to respond to such a demand by offering proof of
identification (like a driver’s license). Reading Hiibel to permit an officer to demand proof of identification misses what Hiibel crafts as a careful distinction between permissible and impermissible police
practices.
106. Id. at 1218–19.
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Court never addressed whether Officer Parsons’ demand for a name and
date of birth violated the Fifth Amendment where “furnishing identity at the
time of a stop would have given the police a link in the chain of evidence
needed to convict the individual of a separate offense.”107
Justice Gustafson’s special concurrence dissented on the first question.108 Joined by Justice Shea and Judge Elizabeth Best (sitting in lieu of
Justice McKinnon), Justice Gustafson noted that the majority drew no distinction between Officer Parsons’ request for a date of birth and the conduct
permitted by the statute (name, address, and explanation), and believed that
the officer’s request was incriminating because Kroschel’s age was an element of the offense suspected.109 Though Justice Gustafson did not cite
Hiibel, it is reasonable to assume that she would have concluded that this
conduct violated both statutory and constitutional constraints. Justice Shea
wrote separately, observing that because the Court ultimately resolved the
question on Fifth Amendment grounds, the majority’s entire analysis of the
initial stop is dicta or possibly an advisory opinion.110
IV. ANALYSIS

OF

MONTANA’S TERRY STATUTE

Though the questions raised by the dissenting Justices are interesting,
this note focuses primarily on the Court’s resolution of the statutory question. I begin with an assumption that Montana’s Terry statute does not
merely codify the Fourth Amendment. I hold this assumption because, as
explained more fully below, the text of the statute constrains officers beyond what is required by federal constitutional law. I recognize the speculative nature of analyzing the Kroschel opinion from a statutory perspective
as the Court addressed the statute in only two or three sentences of its opinion.
Nevertheless, it is my belief that after the Court concluded that there
was no Fourth Amendment nor Article II, § 11 violation, the question became purely statutory; did the officers’ conduct violate Montana’s Terry
statute? Answering this question required an analysis of two issues. First,
what did the legislature mean when it authorized an officer to “request”
certain information rather than “demand” it; can a person decline to answer
free of consequence? Second, what limitations, if any, does the list of enumerated questions (name, address, and explanation of a person’s actions)
107. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Ct. of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 191 (2004).
108. Kroschel, 419 P.3d at 1225–26 (Gustafson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
109. Id. at 1226 n.1. Specifically, Justice Gustafson noted: “The majority fails to recognize requesting a date of birth is not within the information an officer may request under § 46–5–401(2)(a) . . .
(allowing a peace officer to “request the person’s name and present address and an explanation of the
person’s actions”).
110. Id. at 1228–29 (Shea, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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place upon the scope of permissible officer questioning; are these the only
questions an officer is permitted to ask?
A. The meaning of “request”
The Court never analyzed the meaning of “request” in the context of
the statute. However, the Court concluded that Officer Parsons’ conduct did
not violate the statute. Working backwards, we can glean some textual
meaning from the Court’s resolution on the facts.
Officer Parsons was persistent in her pursuit to determine Kroschel’s
true identity; the encounter lasted close to an hour. When Kroschel attempted to leave, Officer Parsons physically stopped her from doing so.
Officer Parsons was resourceful; when Kroschel declined to volunteer her
identity, the officer attempted to get it by asking for her school identification number, her cell phone number, and her parent’s cell phone numbers.
Significantly, there was no violation of the statute where Officer Parsons
advised Kroschel that her failure to answer truthfully could, and did, result
in an obstruction of justice charge. These facts would seem to negate an
interpretation that the word “request” permits an individual to decline to
answer an officer’s “request” free of consequence. This may be a good rule
as matter of policy—Hiibel found that an officer’s ability to reliably identify suspects in the field is essential to good police work—however, it is
problematic as a matter of statutory interpretation.
First, it is a principle of statutory interpretation that where a different
word is used in the same document, it is presumed to have a different meaning.111 Here, the statute uses both words “request” and “demand.” The statute authorizes an officer to “request” certain information (a name, address,
and an explanation) from nondrivers112 and to “demand” certain information (a driver’s license, vehicle’s registration, and proof of insurance) from
drivers.113 This variance in usage indicates that the legislature intended the
word “request” to convey a different meaning than the word “demand.”
It is another principle of statutory interpretation that a court should
interpret a word by its ordinary and nontechnical meaning, unless it is clear
that another meaning is intended.114 To decipher ordinary meaning, courts
often look to dictionaries.115 Here, for example, Black’s Law Dictionary
111. See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL
TEXTS 170 (2012).
112. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46–5–401(2)(a).
113. Id.
114. SCALIA, supra note 111, at 69.
115. See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 582 (2011) (defining the word “license”); Crawford v. Metro Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Co., 555 U.S. 271 (2009) (defining the word
“oppose”).
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defines a “request” as “[a] motion by which a member invokes a right,
seeks permission for the exercise of a privilege, or asks a question,”116
whereas a “demand” is “[t]he assertion of a legal or procedural right.”117 A
broader survey of dictionaries reveals a common theme: a “demand” occurs
when compliance is justified by law, whereas a “request” asks another to do
something under circumstances where they may decline.118 Additionally,
and to a lesser degree, “request” and “demand” are interpreted to convey a
tonal difference distinguished by the force of the verbal order, i.e., a request
is phrased softly or with greater civility than a demand. As a rule of law, it
is difficult to imagine that the legislature meant to prevent officers from
soliciting certain information from nondrivers in an overly strong manner. It
is even harder to imagine that any court would be willing to suppress evidence on this basis, as Montana courts construe purely statutory violations
as grounds for suppression.119 Rejecting this notion, Kroschel indicates that
Montana courts should construe the word “request” to have the same operative force as a “demand” despite the clear textual delineation in the statute.
So, if the words “request” and “demand” are synonyms in Montana’s
Terry statute, a problem arises as the statute authorizes an officer to “request . . . an explanation of the person’s actions.” The Fifth Amendment
protects an individual from being compelled to provide incriminating information, and interpreting the statute to permit an officer to charge an individual with obstructing justice for failing to provide such an explanation exceeds the scope authorized in Hiibel and would seem to render the statute
unconstitutional as interpreted.
116. Request, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 1497 (10th ed. 2014).
117. Demand, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 522 (10th ed. 2014).
118. See WHARTON’S LAW LEXICON 2754, 742 (13th ed. 1925) (defining demand as “a claim, a
challenging, the asking of anything with authority, a calling upon a person for anything due,” and compare with “request-notes: applications to obtain a permit for removing excisable articles,” (there is no
definition for request in-and-of itself)); BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY 330,1098 (3d ed. 1969) (defining demand as “a claim; a legal obligation; a request to perform an alleged obligation; a written statement of a claim . . . a requisition or request under a claim of right . . . the assertion of a right to recover a
sum of money from the person upon who the demand is made.” Id. at 330 (internal citations omitted).
Whereas a “request” is “[t]o ask or express a wish for something . . . [s]ometimes to direct or command,
although in a delicate manner. In other words, a precatory word, subject to construction in a proper case
a mandatory term.” Id. at 1098 (internal citations omitted)); WILLIAM C. BURTON, LEGAL THESAURUS
148, 448 (1980) (“request” the verb is similar to “abjure, appeal, apply for, ask for, beckon, beg for,
beseech, bid, cadge, call for, canvass, claim, clamor for, command, cry for, demand, desire, dun, enjoin,
entreat, exact, impetrate, implorare, implore, importune, invite, make application, mendicate, nag, obsecrare, obtest, order, petition, petition for, plead for, pray for, pray, put in for, require, requisition,
rogare, seek, send for, solicit, sue for, summon, supplicate, urge, want.” Id. at 448 (emphasis added).
Whereas a “demand” is akin to “arrogate, ask for with authority, assert a right to, assert one’s rights, call
for, claim, claim as one’s due, command, direct, enjoin, exact, give notice, impose, insist, make application, order, present one’s claim, press, request, require, urge.” Id. at 148 (emphasis added)).
119. See, e.g., State v. Driscoll, 303 P.3d 788 (Mont. 2013); State v. Bauer, 36 P.3d 892, 897 (Mont.
2001); State v. Krause, 44 P.3d 493 (Mont. 2002).
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Perhaps the statute can be saved from such an interpretation by applying the substantive cannon against constitutional doubt. This cannon simply
instructs a court to avoid adopting an interpretation that places a statute’s
constitutionality in question.120 Here, the statute could be interpreted to give
the word “request” more bite as it as applies to the “request” for a person’s
“name and address” than to an “explanation of the person’s actions.” However, such an interpretation is not without fault as it violates the maxim that
“words or phrases are presumed to bear the same meaning throughout a
text.”121 Textually speaking, I do not think there is a way to square the
Court’s conclusion that Officer Parsons’ conduct did not violate the statute
with a principled interpretation of the statute or risk placing its constitutionality in doubt on self-incrimination grounds.
B. The enumerated list
The second issue raised by the statute is what significance the legislature intended by specifically enumerating a list of questions an officer may
ask of a nondriver who is lawfully stopped. Recall that the limitation does
not derive from the Fourth Amendment, which generally permits an officer
wide latitude to question a suspect.122 The doctrine of expressio unius (also
called the negative implication rule) captures the idea that the “expression
(or inclusion) of one thing indicates exclusion of the other.”123 Courts applying this doctrine will often find that where the legislature specifically
enumerates a list, it does not intend to include those items not listed.124
However, this canon ought to be used in a normative context. For example,
If Mother tells Sally, “Don’t hit, kick, or bite your sister Anne,” Sally is not
authorized by expressio unius to “pinch” her little sister. The reason is that
the normative baseline (discerned from prior practice or just family culture)
is “no harming sister,” and the directive was an expression of that baseline
that ought not be narrowly limited.125

Here, the statute can be read to mean that the legislature’s specific
inclusion of a “name, address, and explanation . . .” excludes the officer
from asking any other questions. This was the conclusion reached by Jus120. SCALIA, supra note 111, at 247; see also United States ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. Delaware & Hudson
Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408 (1909) (“[W]here a statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one of which
grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other of which such questions are avoided,
our duty is to adopt the latter.”).
121. SCALIA, supra note 111, at 170; see also United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 388–97
(1805).
122. See Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333 (2009).
123. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, et. al., LEGISLATION & REGULATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF
PUBLIC POLICY 668 (5th ed. 2014).
124. See Tate v. Ogg, 195 S.E. 496 (Va. 1938) (where the legislature included “any horse, mule,
cattle, hog, sheep or goat” the court found that it did not include turkeys).
125. ESKRIDGE, supra note 123, at 669.
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tice Gustafson, and is arguably supported by Driscoll, which seemed to take
some issue with the fact that the officer had asked for Driscoll’s “age and
an ID, rather than for his name, address, or an explanation for his actions.”126 However, Driscoll found a different violation of the statute—that
the officer had improperly expanded the investigation by taking Driscoll
outside, not by asking unenumerated questions.127 Normatively speaking, it
could be that Driscoll stands for the proposition that where an officer suspects someone of being a minor in possession of alcohol, the request for
one’s age is included within the request for an “explanation of the person’s
actions” in the same way that the example above prohibits pinching even
though it does not expressly say so. By the same token, the majority may be
correct that asking for various forms of proof of identification is the “functional . . . equivalent” of asking for a person’s name, and Hiibel would not
prohibit this practice where it is clear that handing over one’s driver’s license is a courtesy.
If we assume it is improper to construe the statute as playing no limiting role, but to permit officers to ask the enumerated questions and questions reasonably akin to the enumerated questions, did Officer Parsons exceed the scope of the statute by requesting Kroschel’s phone number; is that
the “functional . . . equivalent” of her name? What about the request for
Kroschel’s parent’s cell phone numbers?128
In examining the limiting role of the list, the Court reasoned that there
was no indication from the legislative history that the legislature meant to
limit an officer’s ability to question. Looking to legislative history is a common, though not uncontroversial,129 tool of statutory interpretation. However, not all forms of legislative history should be given equal weight.130
The Court’s use of legislative history here, that legislative absence is indicative of meaning, is the least compelling form of this evidence.131 It is often
referred to as the “Dog that Doesn’t Bark” canon and conveys a presumption that because significant changes are unlikely to go unmentioned, where
no changes are discussed, none are presumed.132 However, reliance on evi126. State v. Driscoll, 303 P.3d 788, 790 (Mont. 2013).
127. Id.
128. Appellant’s Op. Br., City of Missoula v. Kroschel, 2017 WL 2692832, 15 (Mont. 2017).
129. See Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring) (expressing the belief that
where the textual evidence indicates a clear result, a court should not delve into legislative history where
it “serves no purpose except needlessly to inject into the opinion a mode of analysis that not all of the
Justices consider valid”); but see B.J. Ard, Comment, Legislative Drafting Manuals as a Guide to Statutory Interpretation, 120 YALE L. J. 185 (2010) (arguing that reliance on a text’s history is not antithetical to a textualist method of interpretation).
130. ESKRIDGE, supra note 123, at 693.
131. Id. at 829.
132. See Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 396 n.23 (1991); Montana Wilderness Assoc. v. U.S.
Forest Serv., No. 80-3374, withdrawn and replaced by 655 F.2d 951, 953 (9th Cir. 1981).
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dence of absence to rebut the textualist presumption that the legislature intends the words it chooses is improper.
Practically speaking, it is more likely that the legislative history of HB
40 contained no discussion of the limiting effect of the list not because it
did not intend any limiting effect, but because the changes made to this part
of the statute during the 2003 legislative session were relatively insignificant and took a backseat to the discussions surrounding removal of the
mini-Miranda warning and the concern generated over the word “demand.”
When the legislature discussed HB 40, it borrowed from then-in-force
§ 46–5–402 which authorized an officer to request the name and address of
a nondriver. The legislature then added the explanation-of-a-person’s-actions language, which was likely borrowed from the Model Penal Code’s
Uniform Arrest Act.
As an aside, the Court is likely correct that extrinsic evidence supports
the conclusion that this list was not intended to be exhaustive or strictly
interpreted, but there is a better source for this assertion. The language in
the statute now enacted closely tracks language provided in the Model Penal Code’s Uniform Arrest Act of 1942.133 The model statute specified that
where an officer has reasonable suspicion, the officer may “stop any person
abroad . . . and may demand of him his name, address, business abroad and
whither he is going.”134 This provision was designed as a statutory remedy
for a right that was not well recognized at the time: the right of the police to
detain and question a suspect pre-arrest.135
C. A proposed interpretation of Montana’s Terry statute
Because the Court largely side-stepped the statutory analysis, City of
Missoula v. Kroschel remains a missed opportunity to provide lower courts
with necessary interpretation of a statute that provides Montanans with an
important right. For this reason, I will propose what I believe is a better
reading of the statute.
133. Caleb Foote, The Fourth Amendment: Obstacle or Necessity in the Law of Arrest?, 51 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY AND POLICE SCI. 402, 402 (1960).
134. Sam Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. REV. 315, 343–47 (1942).
The full text provides:
(1) a peace officer may stop any person abroad whom he has reasonable ground to suspect is committing, has committed or is about to commit a crime, and may demand of him his
name, address, business abroad and whither he is going.
(2) Any person so questioned who fails to identify himself or explain his actions to the
satisfaction of the officer may be detained and further questioned and investigated.
(3) the total period of detention provided for by this section shall not exceed two hours.
Such detention is not an arrest and shall not be recorded as an arrest in any official record. At
the end of the detention the person so detained shall be released or be arrested and charged
with a crime.
135. Foote, supra note 133, at 402.
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Montana’s Terry statute ought to be read to draw an operative distinction between the words “request” and “demand.” The statute itself delineates between two categories of persons (drivers and nondrivers) and two
categories of actions (requests and demands). When it comes to nondrivers,
the statute permits an officer to “request” a name, address, and explanation
of the person’s action. When it comes to drivers, the presence of the language “and, if” indicates that drivers are the inclusive category. When interacting with a driver, an officer may request all of the information that the
officer could request of a nondriver, but additionally, the officer may demand certain items. As ordinarily understood, the words “request” and “demand” convey different meanings. While a survey of dictionary definitions
supports the idea that there may be overlapping ground, primarily a request
is understood as soliciting a gratuity whereas a demand seeks to enforce an
obligation. These are functionally different acts, and this interpretation in
the context of Montana’s Terry statute accords with the presumption of
meaningful variation because the legislature used both words in different
places in the statute. Because the text of the statute supports this interpretation, it is unnecessary to dive into the legislative history. Nevertheless, the
legislative history, specifically the concerns aired by Representative Shockley which prompted the legislature to specifically use the word “request” in
order to provide a nondriver with the opportunity to decline to answer an
officer free of consequence, supports this interpretation as well.
If I am correct that Montana’s Terry statute ought to be read not to
require an individual to comply with a request for their identity and an
individual may not be charged with obstructing justice for their failure to
reply, Kroschel presented an interesting question of whether a nondriver
may lie in response to an officer’s “request” for their name, as the facts
indicate that Kroschel never explicitly declined to answer Officer Parsons’
questions. I do not believe that this fact should control the outcome. If the
statute does not permit a sanction for the failure to answer, I believe there
can similarly be no sanction for the failure to answer truthfully.
Generally, Montana courts do not require individuals to use precise
words to invoke their rights, as “lay people are not learned in constitutional
principle nor legal nicety. To require precise words be uttered would elevate
form over substance.”136 For example, if in response to an officer’s request
for a name, a person were to answer “Donald Duck,” it has the same effect
of telling the officer that one is invoking their statutory right not to answer.
Here, Kroschel’s evasive responses to the officer (that she left her identification in her stadium seat and that she could not recall her university identi136. State v. Johnson, 719 P.2d 1248, 1255 (Mont. 1986) overruled on other grounds by State v.
Buck, 134 P.3d 53 (Mont. 2006).
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fication number) ought to be interpreted as invoking her statutory right. If
the legislature believes this interpretation to be overly restrictive to law enforcement’s ability to investigate suspicious criminal activity, then the legislature ought to consider repealing Montana’s Terry statute in its entirety.
The Fourth Amendment already permits those actions expressly authorized
by the text of the statute and provides less restrictive constraints.
As for the conduct enumerated in the statute, the doctrine of expressio
unius instructs that a court should not read words into the statute where they
do not appear. In the context of Montana’s Terry statute, it is likely that the
legislature intended to capture the normative principle that an officer may
ask certain questions that further the investigation of suspicious criminal
activity where those questions are similarly akin to those enumerated in the
statute. Driscoll seems to stand for the proposition that in the context of a
suspected minor-in-possession charge, an officer may ask an individual her
age. If the statute is construed not to demand compliance of a nondriver,
there is likely no Fifth Amendment concern. Justice Gustafson believed the
statute to be unconstitutional as applied to a person suspected of drinking
underage. She reasoned that if the statute compels a person to provide their
identity, demanding a person’s name in circumstances where the person is
suspected of drinking underage creates a “real and appreciable fear” that
this information will be used to incriminate them in violation of their Fifth
Amendment rights. However, if this information is not demanded, the asapplied argument is resolved.
V. CONCLUSION
City of Missoula v. Kroschel asked the Court to answer an important
question: what conduct is allowed of a police officer under Montana’s Terry
statute? The plain meaning of the statute indicates that the legislature intended to provide a nondriver with the right to decline to answer officer
questioning free of consequence, which is a significant right. The legislative
history supports this interpretation. Despite the textual and extrinsic evidence, the Court’s analysis of the statute itself was too brief and leaves
lower courts guessing as to how to construe it in the future.

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol81/iss1/5

18

